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Public choice or public choice theory refers to "the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science".〔Gordon Tullock, () 2008, "public choice," ''The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics''. (Abstract ).〕 Its content includes the study of political behavior. In political science, it is the subset of positive political theory that studies self-interested agents (voters, politicians, bureaucrats) and their interactions, which can be represented in a number of ways - using (for example) standard constrained utility maximization, game theory, or decision theory.〔 Public-choice analysis has roots in positive analysis ("what is") but is often used for normative purposes ("what ought to be") in order to identify a problem or to suggest improvements to constitutional rules (i.e., constitutional economics).〔〔James M. Buchanan, 1990. "The Domain of Constitutional Economics," ''Constitutional Political Economy'', 1(1), pp. (1–18 ).〕〔Compare: Dennis C. Mueller, 2008. "constitutions, economic approach to," ''The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics'', 2nd Edition. (Abstract ): "The economic approach to constitutions applies the methodology of economics to the study of constitutions. This entry reviews the normative literature on constitutions, which assumes a two-stage collective decision process, and the positive literature that examines the decisions made by constitutional conventions and their economic consequences."〕 The ''Journal of Economic Literatures classification code regards public choice as a subarea of microeconomics, under JEL: D7: "Analysis of Collective Decision-Making" (specifically, JEL: D72: "Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior").〔Descriptions are in (JEL Classification Codes Guide ), drilled to at JEL: D7 and JEL: D72 respectively.〕 Public choice theory is also closely related to social-choice theory, a mathematical approach to aggregation of individual interests, welfares, or votes.〔Found in the JEL classification codes at JEL: D71.〕 Much early work had aspects of both, and both fields use the tools of economics and game theory. Since voter behavior influences the behavior of public officials, public-choice theory often uses results from social-choice theory. General treatments of public choice may also be classified under public economics.〔 At JEL: HO – General of the JEL classification codes and as in ''The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics'', v. 8, p. 864 and (Online ). 〕 ==Background and development== A precursor of modern public choice theory was the work of Knut Wicksell (1896),〔Knut Wicksell (1896 ()). "A New Principle of Just Taxation," J.M. Buchanan, trans., in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, ed. (1958). ''Classics in the Theory of Public Finance'', Palgrave Macmillan, an essay from Wicksell (1896), ''Finanzthcoretische Untersuchungen'', Jena: Gustav Fischer.〕 which treated government as political exchange, a ''quid pro quo'', in formulating a benefit principle linking taxes and expenditures.〔• Dennis C. Mueller (1976). "Public Choice: A Survey," ''Journal of Economic Literature'', 14(2), p. 396. IV. Politics as Exchange & V. The Constitution of Economic Policy, Nobel Prize lecture. Republished in 1987, ''American Economic Review'', 77(3), pp. (243 )–250.〕 Some subsequent economic analysis has been described as treating government as though it attempted “to maximize some kind sort of welfare function for society” and as distinct from characterizations of economic agents, such as those in business.〔 In contrast, public choice theory modeled government as made up of officials who, besides pursuing the public interest, might act to benefit themselves, for example in the budget-maximizing model of bureaucracy, possibly at the cost of efficiency.〔〔William A. Niskanen (() 1994). ''Bureaucracy and Public Economics'', Elgar. Expanded ed. Description and review (links ) and review (excerpts ).〕 Modern public-choice theory has been dated from the work of Duncan Black, sometimes called “the founding father of public choice”.〔Charles K. Rowley (2008). "Duncan Black (1908–1991," ch. 4 in ''Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy'', Springer, p. (83. )〕 In a series of papers from 1948, which culminated in ''The Theory of Committees and Elections'' (1958),〔Duncan Black (1958). ''The Theory of Committees and Elections'', 2nd rev. ed, 1998, Springer. (Description ) and (preview. )〕 and later, Black outlined a program of unification toward a more general “Theory of Economic and Political Choices” based on common formal methods,〔Duncan Black (1950). "The Unity of Political and Economic Science," ''Economic Journal'', 60(239), pp. (506 ), 514.〕 developed underlying concepts of what would become median voter theory, and rediscovered earlier works on voting theory.〔Duncan Black (1948a). "On the Rationale of Group Decision-making, ''Journal of Political Economy'', 56(1), pp. (23 )–34. • _____ (1948b). "The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority," ''Econometrica'',16(3), pp. (245 )–261. • _____ (1969). "Lewis Carroll and the Theory of Games," ''American Economic Review'', 59(2), pp. (206–210. ) • _____ (1976). "Partial Justification of the Borda Count," ''Public Choice'', 28(1), pp (1– ) 15.〕〔〔Bernard Grofman (() 2008). "Black, Duncan (1908–1991)", ''The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics'', 2nd Edition. Preview (link ).〕 Kenneth J. Arrow’s ''Social Choice and Individual Values'' (1951) influenced formulation of the theory. Among other important works are Anthony Downs (1957) ''An Economic Theory of Democracy'' and Mancur Olson (1965) ''The Logic of Collective Action''.〔Mancur Olson, Jr. (() 1971). ''The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups'', 2nd ed. Harvard University Press, (Description ), (Table of Contents ), and (preview ).〕 James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock coauthored ''The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy'' (1962), considered one of the landmarks in public choice. In particular, the Preface describes the book as “about the ''political organization”'' of a free society. But its methodology, conceptual apparatus, and analytics “are derived, essentially, from the discipline that has as its subject the ''economic'' organization of such a society” (1962, p. (v )). The book focuses on positive-economic analysis as to the development of constitutional democracy but in an ethical context of consent. The consent takes the form of a compensation principle like Pareto efficiency for making a policy change and unanimity or at least no opposition as a point of departure for social choice. Somewhat later, the probabilistic voting theory started to displace the median voter theory in showing how to find Nash equilibria in multidimensional space. The theory was later formalized further by Peter Coughlin.〔Peter J. Coughlin (1991). ''Probabilistic Voting Theory'', Cambridge. (Description ) and chapter-preview (links ).〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Public choice」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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